The literature measuring the effects of WTO membership on trade flows has produced remarkably diverse results. Rose (2004) reports a wide range of empirical specifications that produce no WTO effects. Tomz, et al. (2007) (2007) emphasize general equilibrium trade effects by controlling for multilateral resistance, they find strong WTO trade effects only for industrialized countries. Subramanian and Wei (2007) , however, account neither for unobserved heterogeneity among trading partners, nor for differences in trade effects across PTAs (which could inflate WTO estimates). We unify the Rose, Tomz et al., and Subramanian and Wei specifications in one comprehensive approach that minimizes omitted variable bias to show that all specifications produce one consistent result: WTO effects on trade flows are not statistically significant, while PTAs produce strong but uneven trade effects. Extending the gravity model to address specific avenues in which WTO may have affected trade flows, we find WTO membership boosts trade prior to PTA formation and increases trade among proximate developing countries (at the expense of distant trade). An augmented gravity model that accounts for WTO terms-of-trade theory shows that countries with greater incentives to bargain for tariff reductions before WTO accession experience positive and significant subsequent WTO trade effects.
Introduction
Reductions in trade barriers have been the hallmark of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT).
1 While trade theory holds that tariff reductions should increase trade flows, the empirical literature on the effects of WTO membership has produces surprisingly ambiguous results. Rose (2004) This paper unifies the above approaches to accessing WTO trade effects in order to produce four important insights. First, we show that the literature encompassing Rose, SW, and TGR generates one consistent result. These specifications all produce no evidence of positive WTO trade effects once we control comprehensively for three sources of omitted variable bias: multilateral resistance, unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, and individual PTA trade effects.
Second, our robustness analysis shows that once the Rose, SW, and TGR approaches are unified, and their results correctly interpreted, multilateral resistance controls suffice to negate WTO trade effects. Third, when extending the gravity model to a version more suited to disentangle overlapping WTO and PTA membership, we find that WTO membership boosts trade effects just before PTA accession and increases trade among proximate developing countries, albeit at the expense of distant trade. Fourth, we extend the gravity model to include terms-of-trade theory Staiger, 1999, 2002) , which is specifically designed to analyze the effect of WTO 1 Henceforth we use WTO as a synonym for GATT/WTO. 2 See Table A5 in Rose (2005) .
The absence of WTO trade effects raises the question of whether WTO may foster trade in more subtle ways that cannot be identified by our basic framework unifying the Rose, SW, and TGR approaches. We extend the gravity framework in two dimensions to allow for specific trade effects that are unique to WTO members. The first extension disentangles WTO and PTA trade effects and explores a possible regional dimension of WTO trade creation. PTA accession is found to generate positive trade effects for WTO members and non-members alike. As theory predicts, the magnitude of these PTA trade effects is stronger for WTO non-members.
Meanwhile trade flows between existing PTA members are hardly affected by WTO accession.
There is evidence, however, that WTO membership increased trade flows prior to the formation of PTAs. In addition, WTO membership did foster regional trade integration among developing countries at the expense of more distant trade.
Our second extension incorporates proxies for the terms-of-trade theory of WTO, which, unlike the gravity model, has been specifically designed to model benefits of WTO membership.
The terms-of-trade theory has been expounded in a series of papers by Bagwell and Staiger, who suggest that negotiations through GATT/WTO solve the terms-of-trade externality. Following
Johnson 's (1953-4) optimal tariff/retaliation argument, nations may hesitate to implement unilateral tariff reductions in the absence of WTO. The WTO terms-of-trade theory has received substantial support from Bagwell and Staiger (2010b) and Broda et al. (2008) in smaller datasets.
Examining the trade gains due to WTO in 177 nations over 50 years, we find evidence in support of the terms-of-trade theory, even after controlling for the three sources of omitted variable bias that we discussed above. Specifically, those countries that had substantial incentives to negotiate tariff reductions during their WTO accession negotiations also exhibit significantly larger and positive WTO trade effects than other members, which are found to exhibit no WTO effects.
The paper is organized as follows. After presenting the data in Section 2, we unify the Rose, SW, and TGR approaches to WTO trade effect estimation in a unified baseline framework and demonstrate that all these approaches fail to find positive WTO trade effects (Section 3). Section 3 also provides a detailed discussion of the impacts of PTAs on trade, which are strong but uneven across individual agreements. Section 4 presents extensive robustness analysis for our unified baseline framework. Section 5 extends our unified framework in two directions to (i) further disentangle the effects of WTO and PTA membership and explore regional dimensions of WTO trade creation and (ii) to proxy for the terms-of-trade theory of WTO in the gravity model. Section 6 concludes.
Data
Our data is based on an updated version of SW's unbalanced panel. 6 Their bilateral trade values are derived from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics, deflated by the U.S. consumer price index. The dataset features not only a WTO dummy, but also a dummy that represents industrialized countries' unilateral trade concessions to developing trading partners under the GATT/WTO's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) from 1979 onwards. We adjust the SW dataset to attribute a value of zero to GSP country-pairs that represent an industrialized country exporting to a developing country. The reasoning is that GSP is granted as a unilateral preference (for industrialized countries' imports from developing countries only). We also identify Luxembourg as a member of the European Union (EU) in 2000, and correct other minor coding errors identified by TGR. These changes do not affect our or SW's results qualitatively.
SW employ Rose's definition of de jure WTO membership. However, TGR indicated that de facto WTO members should also be considered. To illustrate that WTO trade effects vanish even when accounting for de facto membership, we use TGR's WTO membership definition throughout and refer the interested reader to the working paper version of this study which features results in the original SW and Rose coding (Eicher and Henn, 2008) . The conclusions are unaffected by the coding convention. A single aggregate PTA indicator dummy has been prominent in a number of empirical trade flow studies (see e.g., Rose 2000 , 2004 , 2005 , Glick and Rose 2002 , to capture the average effect of PTAs on trade flows. We extend the SW dataset and introduce a more extensive set of PTAs used by Rose (2005) and Eicher et al. (2010) to properly account for trade effects of a large set of individual PTAs. Subsequent sections further modify the SW dataset. In Section 3, we include country-pair fixed effects to control for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity and introduce Rose's (2004 Rose's ( , 2005 
A Unified Baseline Framework to Minimize Omitted Variable Bias
In this section, we construct a unified framework from the Rose, SW, and TGR approaches to WTO trade effect estimation. We commence by extending SW to account for individual PTA trade effects to show that their industrialized country WTO effect is actually an industrialized PTA effect. We then extend the framework to incorporate unobserved bilateral heterogeneity controls and allow for the alternative WTO coding convention employed by Rose.
Accounting for Individual PTA Trade Effects
We begin by extending the gravity framework of SW to fully account for the impacts of all trade agreements (WTO, GSP, and individual PTAs). The SW setup has two important characteristics:
First, in addition to time fixed effects, D t , time-varying fixed effects are introduced for importers, D mt , and exporters, D xt , to capture multilateral resistance (see Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006) .
Multilateral resistance can be accounted for with these fixed effects, since any nation faces only one import/export price index at any point in time. The inclusion of time-varying importer and exporter effects requires, however, the dependent variable to be the log of bilateral imports, I mxt , instead of the commonly used average trade flow variable.
The second important characteristic of SW's approach is their coding convention. SW code the trade agreement indicator dummies mutually exclusively to quantify "pure" GSP and WTO trade effects. SW's key assumption is that a PTA membership "represents the culmination of trade integration." Thus SW code trade agreement indicators such that all trade creation is exclusively attributed to PTAs, even if both trading partners are currently (or were previously) WTO/GSP members. For example, if trading partners are members of the WTO, GSP, and the same PTA, only the PTA dummy takes the value "1" in SW's coding convention. Coding is hierarchical throughout, so that when both WTO and GSP dummies could display a "1," only the GSP variable takes that value. The "*" superscripts below indicate mutually exclusive coding.
Our baseline specification replicates SW's preferred specification ( (Table 1a ) then reveals that the "industrialized WTO" dummy in SW's regression 1 is actually an "industrialized PTA" effect, with only the signs reversed because of SW's coding convention.
Accounting for Unobserved Bilateral Heterogeneity
The PTA literature has long considered various PTA estimates (such as AP, LAIA and APEC)
as suspiciously high, relative to the small tariff reductions associated with these agreements (e.g. Frankel, 1992; Frankel and Wei, 1993; Frankel, Stein and Wei, 1995; Frankel, 1997) . There exists substantial evidence, however, that trade agreements tend to form between trading partners whose bilateral trade has been "naturally" elevated all along, due to unobserved characteristics (see e.g. Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) . This raises the risk of incorrectly attributing "natural"
trade-promoting characteristics to trade agreements. SW attempted to control for such countrypair specific characteristics with the inclusion of a number of control variables contained in the vector Z above. However, the resulting WTO and PTA coefficients are biased upwards, if the included controls do not account for all bilateral heterogeneity, for instance because some is unobserved. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) and Cheng and Wall (2005) (Table 1a) . Most individual trade agreements see their trade effects at least halved in regressions 5 and 6. In contrast, trade creation in the EU increases, and the EU coefficient is now estimated with considerable precision. The case of the EU is discussed in Section 3.5, when we examine the individual PTA trade effects in detail.
The expanded SW results in regressions 1-6 give rise to the question whether the absence of WTO trade effects may be an artifact of the hierarchical, mutually exclusive coding in SW. As discussed above, when increases in trade flows are attributed to PTAs rather than to both, WTO and PTA memberships, one may suspect that the SW coding convention underestimates WTO trade effects. More problematically, the industrialized WTO effect is actually an implicit "industrialized PTA" effect, given the structure of the data. In the next section, we apply the more conventional, mutually inclusive WTO coding (as in Rose, 2004) to allow for separate identification of WTO and PTA trade effects. This analysis has two purposes. Not only will it settle whether the SW coding convention is driving the results, but it is also a substantive extension of Rose (2004 Rose ( , 2005 , because we extend his specification to introduce both disaggregate PTAs as well as comprehensive multilateral resistance controls.
Accounting for Alternative WTO Coding Conventions
Rose ( An exact comparison between Rose's standard coding convention and SW can be achieved by simply reproducing regressions 1-3 with mutually inclusive coding.
Equation (1') is essentially Rose's specification with multilateral resistance controls. The only difference between (1) and (1') is the coding convention, where inclusive coding is now denoted by "**" superscripts. 12 The WTO dummy is again disaggregated to identify membership effects for industrialized and developed nations, GSP trading partners. Crucial is that under Rose's coding convention both WTO and GSP variables take on the value "1" when the two conditions are fulfilled. In addition, when the same trading partners are members in a common PTA, mutually inclusive coding assigns the value "1" to all three dummies. For comparison purposes, it is important to point out that inclusive coding delivers coefficient estimates that represent pure PTA trade effects. There is no need to produce net effects via the Delta method as in the SW case.
We proceed again in stages. First we provide results based on equation (1'), and then we add country-pair fixed effects to control for all time-invariant bilateral heterogeneity. Inclusion of country-pair effects again converts the constant a 0 to a pair-specific one, D mx :
Regression 7 in Table 2 establishes a baseline regression that represents our closest analogue to Rose's preferred regressions (Table 1 in Rose, 2004) . It represents a robustness test of Rose's findings that examines whether comprehensive accounting for multilateral resistance affects his original results. Regression 7 also provides a robustness check of SW's preferred regression (Table 1 , regression 1) to examine whether results are affected by the coding convention.
Rose's preferred regressions report insignificant WTO trade effects throughout. The insertion of multilateral resistance controls does not change Rose's conclusions regarding WTO trade effects. Regression 7 shows that trade creation due to WTO membership for both industrialized and developing countries is insignificant. Even when the industrial and developing country WTO dummies in regression 7 are aggregated to one WTO dummy, the effect remains insignificant (see Table 5 , regression 13). The only change is that Rose's GSP effect is eliminated.
A comparison of regressions 1 and 7 highlights that coding conventions do not drive our key conclusion. Both mutually inclusive and exclusive coding conventions render the WTO effect statistically and economically insignificant. In Rose-style mutually inclusive coding, this is more 12 Strictly speaking, there exists one additional discrepancy between mutually inclusive and exclusive coding of multilateral trade agreements. Mutually exclusive coding assigns a "1" to any WTO importer (without PTA or GSP relationship), while inclusive coding assigns a "1" only when both importer and exporter are WTO members. The reason is the collinearity between inclusive WTO-dummies and multilateral resistance controls. Specifically, the inclusive WTO dummy takes the value "1" for all observations that relate to a member countries' trade in a given year, which establishes collinearity with the importer-year dummy that controls for multilateral resistance. By construction, this collinearity is avoided in mutually exclusive coding since WTO importers are not considered WTO members when the WTO importer is in a PTA or GSP relationship with the exporter.
immediately apparent, because PTA coefficients provide net effects: hence the industrialized WTO dummy cannot function as an error-correction term. Under mutually inclusive coding it is not possible for a WTO dummy to implicitly split the aggregate PTA variable into North-North PTAs (with lower net trade creation) and South-South PTAs (with higher net trade creation) as in the case of mutually exclusive coding above. As a result, mutually inclusive coding in Table 2 can never deliver significant WTO coefficients.
The significant WTO coefficient in SW was only significant because mutually exclusive coding produced PTA coefficients that include both PTA and WTO trade effects. Given the structure of the data this implies that the industrialized WTO effect was actually an industrialized PTA effect. Hence we point to the important insight that the net effect generated by mutually inclusive coding significantly reduces the risk of omitted variable bias. Mutually exclusive coding, on the other hand, holds the danger that WTO dummies are biased when the following two conditions are met: (1) The individual trade effects of PTAs in regression 12 are the most "reasonable" among all our regressions, in the sense that the net trade creation for most PTAs is estimated to range between 30% and 80%. Curiously, the Central and Latin American Trade Agreements (CACM, CARICOM, MERCOSUR and LAIA) show the largest increases in relative trade. These are also the only PTAs that report net increases in trade creation of over 100% (with the exception of SPARTECA, which reports an increase of 124% = e 0.807 -1). Note, however, that with the exception of LAIA, the implied trade effects are all lower than in the original Rose or SW specifications in Tables 1 and 2 .
Most notable is the reduction in the estimated net trade creation for most PTAs, after we control for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity. Comparing regression 9 to 12 reveals that, with the exception of the EU, CACM and LAIA, all PTA estimates are substantially reduced when we include country-pair fixed effects. In other words, our results suggest strongly that PTAs are formed between countries that have been sharing characteristics favorable to mutual trade all along. In this case, tariff reduction may simply be an afterthought. Controlling for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity also improves the precision of the estimates in all cases but NAFTA. The suspiciously large net trade creation of NAFTA (230%) in regression 9 is reduced to insignificance after we control for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity.
Controlling for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity also increased trade creation for three PTAs (EU, EFTA and CACM). Given these PTA member countries' characteristics, their actual trade flows are not large enough relative to the prediction of the gravity model. For example, in the case of CACM, all countries share a common language, colonizer, and proximity. The introduction of country-pair fixed effects resolves the systematic overprediction of the gravity model in this case and allows a better assessment of the impact of PTA accession. The fact that the EU trade impact is underestimated in both the traditional and multilateral resistanceaugmented versions of the gravity equation is well known (e.g., Aitken, 1973; Rose, 2004) . Our estimates show a statistically significant 37% (= e 0.312 -1) increase in trade due to EU accession, once we control for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity. In the case of the EU, it is likely that the large market and the strong harmonization efforts allowed firms to overcome trade fixed costs that subsequently led to strong trade creation between both member and non-member countries (e.g. Freund, 2000; Melitz, 2003) . The increase in absolute trade volume among EU members that we observe seems then reasonably small compared to trade increases with non-members. It is also important to note that our estimates imply that EU members reaped another 34% trade benefit when they became EEA members in 1994.
Another trade agreement that has been the subject of great interest in the PTA literature is APEC. Highly significant and truly exorbitant APEC trade creation estimates (around 300%) have been common in the gravity literature, although APEC is only a forum without implications for tariffs (see e.g. Frankel and Wei, 1993; Frankel, Stein and Wei, 1995; Frankel, 1997) .
Regression 9 indicates that the inclusion of multilateral resistance lowers values for the APEC coefficient substantially to 123% (=e 0.802 -1). The inclusion of unobserved bilateral heterogeneity controls shows that much of the trade creation originally attributed to APEC was due to bilateral unobservables. While this had been the suspicion of Frankel and coauthors all along, their quest to identify these unobservable drivers has largely been unsuccessful. In our preferred regression 12, which controls for multilateral resistance, unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, and individual PTA trade effects, the APEC's trade creation estimate drops to 28% (=e 0.244 -1).
Robustness
In this section we examine whether WTO trade effects are sensitive to alternative econometric approaches that account for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity or accession dynamics. Since most industrialized countries joined the WTO early, we also examine whether WTO trade effects differ for early or late joiners, and whether WTO trade effects differ across decades.
Unobserved Bilateral Heterogeneity and WTO Trade Effects
Above we hold that a comprehensive approach to addressing both multilateral resistance and unobserved bilateral heterogeneity is crucial to obtaining unbiased WTO estimates. Instead of the country-pair fixed effects we employed above, we follow Baier and Bergstrand (2007) in this section and first-difference the data. In this specification the time-varying importer/exporter dummies can then be interpreted as the change in multilateral resistance. Regression 13 (Table 3) establishes a benchmark by adding only country-pair fixed effects to a simple OLS specification with time fixed effects. As expected this produces qualitatively identical results as the analog first-differenced setup in regression 14. If anything, the country-pair fixed effect specification produces larger WTO trade effects.
14 This finding has three important implications. First, regression 13 shows that there is sufficient power in the data to produce significant WTO trade effects (if such an effect exists), even after 7138 country-pair fixed effects have been added. Second, either econometric approach produces highly significant and positive WTO membership effects. This is essentially replicating the TGR result, who showed that, given Rose's own coding convention, WTO trade effects were indeed significant in the presence of country-pair fixed effects. This implies our third result, namely that controlling for bilateral heterogeneity with country-pair fixed effects does not drive our baseline results in Tables 1 and 2 . Instead it is the addition of proper multilateral resistance controls that negate the influence of WTO on bilateral trade flows.
This important third implication can be confirmed by adding multilateral resistance to the first-differenced specification to obtain regression 15. This is the first-differenced analog of regression 10 (Table 2 ) and again, WTO trade effects disappear only when multilateral resistance is added. Only a weak, marginally significant WTO effect remains for developing countries. An alternative approach is to allow for AR(1) error terms to control for bilateral heterogeneity. Once multilateral resistance is added, WTO trade effects largely vanish here as well (regression 17).
This time, it is a weak industrialized country WTO effect that remains marginally significant at the 10% level. Our other robustness tables below confirm that the WTO effect always vanishes largely because of the introduction of multilateral resistance controls. Table 4 cannot address causality. Again, while country-pair fixed effects leave the WTO effect largely intact, it is eliminated by the introduction of multilateral resistance controls. Once again, our preferred three-way regression 21 shows no significant effect of WTO membership on trade growth either pre-accession or during WTO membership.
WTO Accession Dynamics

Variations in WTO Trade Effects Over Time
There is a possibility that the WTO coefficient's lack of significance is due to large variations in OLS, multilateral resistance, country-pair fixed effects, and our preferred three-way fixed effects approach. Our baseline results are confirmed for each decade. For each time period, the threeway fixed effect approach (column 4) eliminates any significant trade effect of WTO membership. Columns 2 and 3 demonstrate that country-pair fixed effects do not suffice to eliminate the WTO effect in most instances. Instead, the WTO effect is again negated by the multilateral resistance controls.
WTO Trade Effects for Industrialized Early Joiners
Another potential problem that is associated with the particular timing of WTO accessions Table A3 in Eicher and Henn (2008) .
both countries were GATT/WTO members from 1948 onward, but this effect is absorbed by the country-fixed effect between them. Omission of industrialized early joiners in the estimation of the aggregate WTO effect is problematic in view of the terms-of-trade theory, which will be described in more detail in Section 5.3. The theory holds that larger countries with market power have the largest incentives to negotiate tariff reductions upon WTO accession and thus may also reap the largest trade gains.
Regression 22a (Table 5 ) provides evidence in favor of the theory's prediction. It shows substantial and significant increases in trade for the subset of industrialized country pairs that joined the WTO prior to 1950. The OLS coefficient for these pre-1950 WTO members is significantly larger and the standard error remarkably lower than for the full sample. Once multilateral resistance is introduced, the full sample shows no WTO trade effects, but these pre-1950 WTO members show statistically and economically significant trade creation. This is a notable feat given that multilateral resistance controls eliminated WTO trade effects in virtually all other specifications. Thus, there may be reason to believe that the multilateral trading system indeed boosted trade among these industrialized early joiners. Note, however, that since regression 22a cannot include both country-pair fixed effects and a WTO dummy, a caveat necessarily remains. We cannot identify whether the higher trade among these 15 industrialized nations is indeed due to WTO membership or due to an unobserved trade-enhancing characteristic among them.
In Search of WTO Trade Effects: Extending the Unified Framework
Taken together with the strong PTA trade creation from before, these results on industrialized early joiners raise the suspicion that WTO membership may raise trade in more subtle ways than identified by our basic unified framework. In search of more subtle WTO trade effects, this section presents two extensions to our framework. The first extension sets out a gravity model specifically suited to disentangling overlapping PTA and WTO membership. It is then used to investigate whether WTO may have fostered trade regionally, along lines of future PTAs or more generally. We find evidence that WTO membership may underpin regional trade integration among developing countries and in the run-up to PTA formation. The second extension incorporates proxies for the terms-of-trade theory, for which we find support in the data. Our results imply that those countries that had substantial incentives to negotiate tariff reductions during their WTO accession negotiations also exhibit significantly larger and positive WTO trade effects than other members.
Disentangling WTO and PTA Trade Effects
Above we assumed that the choice of being in a PTA and/or the WTO is independent. In this section we explore how PTA and WTO membership interact to influence bilateral trade flows.
16
Given that PTA and WTO membership overlaps substantially, it may perhaps be the case that we
were not able to find WTO trade effects because of the basic gravity model's inability to disentangle the different impacts. To address this concern, this section's extended gravity model explicitly allows bilateral trade flows to be determined by interactions of PTA and WTO membership.
Suppose country-pair, (m, x), consists of WTO members that decide to join a common PTA.
We would expect the impact of PTA membership on country m's imports from country x to be smaller than for two non-WTO members that join a common PTA. 
The interpretation of the parameters in equation (3)  , because PTA-induced liberalization should 16 The idea for this section was suggested to us by Robert Staiger. 17 APEC might be a case in point, because it never actually instituted tariff reductions among member countries. 18 We report results only for the most comprehensive fixed effects and Rose's conventional coding methodology. Results are similar for alternative fixed effects specifications; they can be obtained from the authors upon request. Table 6 reports the results from equation (3). While it delivers more structured insights into the mechanics of the WTO trade effects, it nevertheless broadly confirms our previous results.
To economize on space, only the preferred three-way fixed effects results are reported, which include controls for multilateral resistance, unobserved country-pair heterogeneity, and time 
Are WTO Trade Effects Regional?
The steady reduction of transport costs over the time period covered by our dataset suggests less regionalization of trade. In contrast, market size effects can lower trade costs sufficiently to boost regional but not distant trade (see Baldwin, 2008) . WTO accession may thus exert asymmetric effects on proximate/distant trade. Many of these effects are already addressed by multilateral resistance and country-pair fixed effects. However, country-pair fixed effects account only for average bilateral effects over the entire sample period and they might not capture time-varying effects, especially after trading partners enter the WTO. In addition, it may also be the case that WTO membership increased regional trade particularly for countries that eventually form PTAs.
In this case, some WTO trade effects may be falsely picked up by PTA coefficients.
To investigate whether WTO trade effects are regional, we add a dummy to equation (3) to identify trading partners that are a) currently in the WTO, and b) join a common PTA in the future. The results are presented in regressions 30a and 31a (Table 6 ). Again, we do not find a significant effect: WTO members' trade with future PTA partners did not increase soon after WTO accession. Alternatively, we also investigate whether WTO membership increases trade among PTA partners-to-be over time. To do so, we split the PTA regressor into dummies that indicate the pre-PTA accession period, (t-1), the PTA accession period, (t), and all subsequent periods, [t+1, n). Results are reported in 
Variations in WTO Trade Effects According to Terms-of-Trade Theory
Strict economic interpretations of Rose's, SW's, or our findings can be difficult at times because the basic gravity model does not provide a specific theoretical framework to analyze WTO trade effects. Bagwell and Staiger (2010a) suggest that the absence of theoretical guidance which specifically addresses WTO effects on trade calls into question whether the Rose/SW gravity approach can claim to provide a comprehensive assessment of WTO trade effects. In this section we augment the gravity model to proxy for effects suggested by the terms-of-trade theory, which has been specifically designed to analyze the effects of WTO membership. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) put forth a terms-of-trade-theory of GATT which finds WTO membership particularly useful for governments that seek to escape a terms-of-trade-driven prisoners' dilemma. The notion is that large countries with market power and the ability to influence world prices will do so through trade barriers that move the terms of trade in their (2010b) show that terms-of-trade theory is consistent with observed patterns of negotiated tariff concessions. Specifically, the authors derive an econometric model that suggests the international cost-shifting incentives increase with a country's import volume. Accordingly, the larger a country's Nash import volume, the greater should be its incentive to negotiate tariff cut at WTO accession.
The key insight from Bagwell and Staiger (2010b) is that country characteristics affect accession negotiations, tariff concessions, and hence the subsequent trade gains that can be generated by WTO membership. Their data clearly shows that for recent WTO accession countries, greater import volumes were associated with larger tariff cuts, which should then generate larger trade gains. Following Staiger and Bagwell (2010), we focus on import volumes as a proxy for the gains a country may reap from liberalization. Specifically, we attempt to discern whether countries with higher import volumes in their WTO accession year possessed greater terms-of-trade incentives to negotiate tariff reductions, which then generated larger subsequent trade gains. Table 8 reports that WTO trade effects indeed increase with trade volumes at accession, suggesting that countries with larger import volumes (relative to world trade) negotiated larger tariff reductions at accession. Table 8 are obtained by augmenting a regression specified by equation (2') with an additional dummy that indicates whether a country ranks above a specific import volume threshold at the time of WTO accession. As we vary the threshold from the 66 th to the 95 th percentiles, we find that those countries which rank below the 66 th percentile in import volumes never experience positive WTO trade effects. WTO trade effects turn positive and significantly different from the rest of the sample for countries that rank above the 85 th percentile in imports relative to world trade. The trade effects increase in magnitude and significance until the 90 th and 95 th percentiles, at which point not only the marginal, but also the aggregate WTO trade effects are positive and significant. The results imply a 17% (=e0.162-1) trade increase due to WTO membership for countries in the highest import percentiles. This WTO trade effect is not as large as some of the PTA trade effects we found in Table 2 . When comparing magnitudes it must be considered, however, that PTA trade effects include industrialized countries, while the WTO trade effects in Table 8 exclude trade effects generated by industrialized country pairs that joined prior to 1950. 20 [FOOTNOTE] Since exactly this set of countries had presumably the greatest terms of trade externalities, it is all the more remarkable that we can establish the pattern of WTO trade gains suggested by terms-of-trade theory among the set of remaining countries.
Results in
Our result complements Staiger and Bagwell (2010, Figure 1b) , who find in a sample of 16 countries (from 1995-2000) that those countries whose import quantities exceeded the 80 th percentile agreed to greater than average tariff concessions in their WTO accession negotiations, and that the tariff concessions increased dramatically for countries whose import quantities exceeded the 90 th percentile. We observe a similar effect in Table 8 in terms of magnitudes of WTO trade gains in our sample of 177 countries over 50 years. However, our effect relates to post-WTO accession import gains rather than tariff concessions at WTO accession. Presumably these import gains were generated by correspondingly larger tariff concessions at accession.
Conclusion
This paper reexamines the effects of WTO membership on bilateral trade flows. First we show that a number of previous approaches can be combined into one unified framework. This framework controls comprehensively for omitted variable bias in three dimensions: individual PTA effects, multilateral resistance, and unobserved bilateral heterogeneity. Our results show that all previous approaches (Rose, 2004 (Rose, , 2005 Subramanian and Wei, 2007; and Tomz, Goldstein, and Rivers, 2007) produce the result that WTO membership does not generate statistically significant trade effects. The analysis highlights that the diverging and conflicting results regarding WTO trade effects in the literature were generated by omitted variable bias.
20 See the discussion in Section 4.4 of Table 5 , regressions 22a and 22b.
In contrast, we find that PTAs create trade strongly, but unevenly across individual agreements. The magnitude of our individual PTA estimates resolves a number of empirical puzzles. Most notably, the non-tariff reducing APEC is shown to exert comparatively little trade impact, and the strongly tariff reducing EU is shown to be trade creating. Trade theory motivates the inclusion of comprehensive multilateral resistance controls to pick up variations in relative trade costs. These controls are shown to be insufficient to generate unbiased estimates of trade agreements' impacts on trade flows. Of crucial importance are also country-pair fixed effects that control for unobserved bilateral characteristics.
In two extensions of the gravity model that account for specific ways in which theory suggests WTO trade creation, we find positive and significant trade effects. Our first extension disentangles overlapping WTO and PTA membership effects. We find that WTO membership increases trade effects just before PTA accession. In addition, WTO membership fosters regional trade integration among developing country members at the expense of more distant trade. Our second extension augments the gravity model with proxies for the WTO terms-of-trade theory.
Here we find that countries with greater incentives to bargain for tariff reductions during WTO accession negotiations exhibit positive and significant WTO trade effects. 0.293 *** (0.079) Notes: *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels. Standard errors in parentheses. GSP and PTA coefficients are net of WTO effects, see footnote 10. All regressions include time fixed effects. Fixed effects results are not reported. MLR indicates multilateral resistance controls, i.e. time-varying importer and exporter fixed effects. CPFE indicates unobserved bilateral heterogeneity controls, i.e. country-pair fixed effects. Additional regressors not reported include all common gravity variables discussed in the text (equation 1). All these regressors are significant at the 1% level throughout, except Common Nation and Border. Full results are available from the authors upon request. 0.244 *** (0.071) Notes: *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include time fixed effects. Fixed effects results are not reported. MLR indicates multilateral resistance controls, i.e. time-varying importer and exporter fixed effects. CPFE indicates unobserved bilateral heterogeneity controls, i.e. country-pair fixed effects. Additional regressors not reported include all common gravity variables discussed in the text (equation 1). All these regressors are significant at the 1% level throughout, except Common Nation and Border. Full results are available from the authors upon request. (Greene, 2003) . All regressions include all appropriate covariates (as in Table 2 ) and higher order interactions. WTO interactions with future PTA membership dummy, β 4 , are omitted for space reasons. Full results are available upon request from the authors. All regressions feature country-pair fixed effects (CPFE), multilateral resistance (MLR), and TGR WTO membership definition. 0.124 (0.141) Notes: *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels. Standard errors in parentheses. † indicates composite coefficients were calculated using the Delta method (Greene, 2003) . Regressions based on specifications in Table  2 . The regressions also include all appropriate higher order interactions involving PTA/WTO&GSP/Distance. Full results are available upon request from the authors. All regressions feature country-pair fixed effects (CPFE), multilateral resistance (MLR), and TGR WTO membership definition. 0.155** (0.074) 1 Imports_x% is a dummy that identifies countries whose imports jt /(world_imports t ) exceed the x th percentile (where t is the year of country j's accession to the GATT/WTO). The percentile rankings are generated as follows: First, we obtain the ratio of country imports jt over world_imports t from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. Second, countries acceding WTO in year t are then percentile-ranked relative to all other countries in year t. (Results are just about identical when establish a simple percentile ranking of all accession year ratios.) Data availability required that some WTO accession countries had to be ranked based on a post WTO accession year data : Bangladesh 1973 (1972 ), Bermuda 1958 (1948 ), Comoros 1969 (1948 , Dem. Rep. of Congo 1972 (1971 ), Kuwait 1973 (1963 ), and Seychelles 1970 (1963 , where the formal accession year is provided in the parentheses. Antigua and Barbuda and South Africa had to be omitted due to missing data.
† Composite coefficients calculated using the Delta method (Greene, 2003) . Notes: *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels. Standard errors in parenthesis. Regressions based on Table 2 specifications. Full results are available upon request from the authors. Notes: *, **, *** are 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels. Standard errors in parenthesis. Fixed effect coefficients are suppressed. All regressions include time fixed effects. Due to SW's coding convention, PTA and GSP effects are calculated according to footnote 14. Average Trade data is obtained from Rose (2004) . As specified in the text, these regressions also include Log of importer GDP, Log of exporter GDP, Log of importer GDP per capita, Log of exporter GDP per capita, importer is Landlocked, exporter is Landlocked, importer is Island, exporter is Island, Log of importer Land Mass, Log of exporter Land Mass, Currency Union, Current Colony, Ever Colony, Common Colonizer, Common Language, Same Nation, Common Border, Log of Distance. Full results are available upon request from the authors.
